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Abstract—Data centers play a key role in today’s Internet.
Cloud applications are mainly hosted on multi-tenant warehouse-
scale data centers. Anomalies pose a serious threat to data
centers’ operations. If not controlled properly, a simple anomaly
can spread throughout the data center, resulting in a cascading
failure. Amazon AWS had been affected by such incidents re-
cently. Although some solutions are proposed to detect anomalies
and prevent cascading failures, they mainly rely on application-
specific metrics and case-based diagnosis to detect the anomalies.
Given the variety of applications on a multi-tenant data center,
proposed solutions are not capable of detecting anomalies in a
timely manner. In this paper we design an application-agnostic
anomaly detection scheme. More specifically, our design uses
a highly distributed data mining scheme over network-level
traffic metrics to detect anomalies. Once anomalies are detected,
simple actions are taken to mitigate the damage. This ensures
that errors are confined and prevents cascading failures before
administrators intervene.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data centers are the most critical infrastructure to host large-
scale, complex enterprise and cloud applications [8]. Over
the years, data centers have undergone great growth in two
aspects. On one hand, the hardware capacity of a data center
has become much more powerful than ever before. On the
other hand, the popularity of cloud computing has motivated
the growth of multi-tenant support in data centers [20], [24],
[28]. As a result, it is typical that today’s data centers host
tens or even hundreds of tenants and that each tenant runs
tens or hundreds of applications. With such unprecedented
system scale and application complexity, there comes a great
challenge: how to deal with anomalies caused by a variety
of factors, such as hardware faults, configuration mistakes,
software bugs, flaws in application designs, and attacks.
This paper addresses large-scale anomaly detection and
mitigation. In such cases an anomaly in a particular device or
application could “spill off” to affect many other applications
in the same data center. In the worst case, such an anomaly
could trigger a sequence of problems and lead to system-wide
outages, known as a cascading failure [10], [11], [21]. For
multi-tenant data centers, a cascading failure could affect a
large number of tenants and result in considerable loss. The
Amazon AWS outage in April 2011 is a typical example
of cascading failure [2]. During a routine maintenance, a
routing misconfiguration created congestion on a small number
of links. The congestion caused loss of keep-alive messages
between many primary and backup storage nodes. As a results,
the primary nodes mistakenly decided that the backup nodes
were down, and thus started to create new mirror nodes.
The mirroring operation intensified the congestion and sub-
sequently triggered even more mirroring operations, which
in turn exhausted the data center storage and bandwidth
resources. Furthermore, the above events triggered such a
large number of messages to the control plane that the load
eventually brought down the control plane. The outage of the
control plane caused even more impacts to the entire system.
Although the initial misconfiguration was detected and fixed
quickly, the damage had been made and the outage affected a
large number of tenants running on top of AWS. It took four
days to completely restore the entire system.
Due to the complexity of large-scale data centers and
applications, it is often non-trivial to detect an anomaly, locate
the root causes, and perform mitigation. While insightful
discoveries have been made on data center traffic patterns
that suggest regardless of applications running in a data
center some trends tend to be consistent [1], [9], [17], current
solutions heavily rely on case-specific analysis and are often
labor-intensive [30], [31]. One must have certain knowledge
on the type and characteristics of an application to monitor
its operation and perform anomaly detection. While such
approaches are indispensable, it is not the best choice to solely
rely on experienced system administrators to perform the tasks,
especially in large-scale systems such as a data center. In
particular, it is often impossible for the operator of a multi-
tenant data center to obtain the type and characteristics of a
tenant’s applications.
According to a recent analysis [18], from 2009 to 2011 the
number of cloud vulnerability incidents more than doubled. In
particular, some disruptions were so severe that they caused
large-scale service outage lasting for hours or even days. For
example, the Amazon AWS experienced several large-scale
outages [6]. Reddit and NetFlix are just a few example of
web services that experienced wide disruptions during recent
Amazon AWS incidents [3], [4]. Other major cloud players
such as Microsoft and Google have experienced similar inci-
dents as well [13], [19]. Table I lists a few well-documented
major data center failures in the past few years. This list is
by no means exhaustive. Many service providers even choose
not to report incidents for various reasons. We estimate that
the actual impacts from data center anomalies are far more
intense than what has been reported.
We propose to design a highly resilient data center with the
following key properties:
• Detect anomalies as quickly as possible. Errors should
not propagate through the entire data center. Detecting
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Service Date Duration Refer to
Amazon AWS Apr. 2011 4 Days [2]
Amazon AWS Oct. 2012 8 Hours [4]
Amazon AWS Dec. 2012 12 Hours [3]
Sidekick Fall 2009 1 Week [29]
Hotmail Dec. 2010 3 Days [19]
Intuit Jun. 2010 3 Days [15]
Google services Jan. 2014 30-60 Minutes [13]
TABLE I: Recent well-documented data center outages
anomalies in real time enables data center operators to
proceed with quick mitigation actions. This will prevent
the cascading failures so as to confine the damage that
could possibly caused by a small application or network
error.
• Avoid using application-specific information for de-
tection. Multi tenancy, widely adapted in warehouse-
scale data centers, limits amount of information that is
available to data center operators. For example, detecting
a misconfiguration in a local name resolution service is
pretty straightforward by analyzing its logs. However,
these logs are only available to the tenant. Thus, data
center operators cannot rely on application-specific met-
rics for anomaly detection. A solid and useful anomaly
detection scheme should make the most from information
accessible to data center operators.
• Mitigate errors using simple actions. Our analysis
of previous failures shows that examples of cascading
failure errors could easily be prevented by using simple
mitigation actions such as throttling flows in the data
center. Such simple actions are effective to prevent errors
from spreading to the entire system and do not generate
severe negative impact to the system.
Contributions
We propose an automated anomaly detection and mitigation
scheme for data centers. Our scheme uses data mining over
network-level traffic metrics to detect anomalies. We also
study several cases of well-documented outages in Amazon
AWS.
A multi-stage detection and mitigation scheme is used to
prevent propagation of errors in data centers. During the
first stage, our algorithm detects traces of abnormal behavior
in specific traffic metrics. At the next stage, the correlation
between detected traces of anomalies will be determined.
Those with high correlation are potentially anomalies. Once
an abnormality is detected, it is essential to perform mitigation
actions so as to avoid potential cascading failures. Small-scale
and local anomalies are neglected as long as they do not
spread.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §II introduces
our design for anomaly detection and mitigation in data cen-
ters. §III defines and explores symptoms of abnormal behavior
in traffic patterns. §IV elaborates the proposed 2-step anomaly
detection algorithm. §V explores well-documented outages in
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Fig. 1: Proposed architecture for anomaly detection.
Amazon AWS. §VI explores existing work in this area. Finally,
§VII concludes the paper.
II. ANOMALY DETECTION AND
MITIGATION FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we target high-impact anomalies that pose
threat to the data center at large scale. That is, the anomaly
affects many VMs or services. Traffic traces from affected
VMs are influenced during the anomaly. We show that certain
traffic metrics are influenced the most during anomalies.
To detect anomalies, our design monitors traffic traces.
VMs with suspicious traffic patterns are further analyzed.
Our algorithms are designed to find groups of VMs that
suffer from the same anomaly. Upon detection of such groups,
data center operators are immediately notified. Furthermore,
mitigation actions are performed so as to prevent anomalies
from spreading through the data center.
A. Symptoms
Our scheme constantly monitors traffic traces looking for
symptoms of anomalous behavior. A symptom is a certain
type of pattern in traffic traces, such as an increase in Round
Trip Time (RTT), or abrupt change in creation/termination rate
of flows. We base our detection on observing and analyzing
symptoms. A large-scale anomaly that affects a lot of VMs in
a data center creates a good deal of symptoms. In particular,
the same type of symptoms tend to be observed in large
quantity at many hosts. For example, a misconfigured router
may cause increased RTT and packet losses for many flows.
A malfunctioning cloud application may cause many of its
VMs to create new flows at an abnormal speed. Generated
symptoms caused by a specific anomaly are correlated in
time domain as well as space domain. More specifically, an
anomaly creates symptoms with the same pattern over time
and the symptoms appear on malfunctioning hosts at roughly
the same time. These two types of relations between the
observed symptoms are called time domain and space domain
correlation respectively.
Our design relies on global scale correlation-based analysis
of the symptoms to detect anomalies. While it is true that cer-
tain anomalies cause application outages but do not generate
obvious symptoms, neither do such anomalies affect the data
center operation at large. Detection and mitigation of such
anomalies are beyond the scope of this work.
B. Architecture
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of our design. The main
components are Agents and the Controller.
• Agent: An agent is a VM that runs on a physical
server hosting application VMs. The agent monitors and
analyzes the inbound and outbound traffic to identify
various types of symptoms. Agents communicate with
controller to report detected symptoms. Hypervisors are
modified to recognize the special role of the agent. Thus,
they interact with agents accordingly. At fine granularity,
the hypervisor duplicates the header of each inbound and
outbound packet and passes the header to the agent for
analysis. Packet duplication at hypervisor ensures that our
scheme does not incur any additional delay in packet
forwarding.
• Controller: Controller receives symptoms’ reports from
the agents and performs the correlation. It make decisions
on anomaly detection based on the global correlation
of symptoms in time and space domains. Controller is
responsible for raising alerts to data center operators and
having hypervisors initiate the automated mitigation. Mit-
igation is done by limiting the resource access (typically
bandwidth) of certain type of traffic or certain VMs.
The design can scale out by using multiple controllers.
C. Detection Method
A specific anomaly triggers similar symptoms in affected
hosts. These symptoms are observed at affected hosts at
roughly the same time. Therefore, they are correlated in
space domain. Similarly hosts affected by the same anomaly
experience the same pattern of symptoms. Hence, symptoms
are also correlated in time domain.
For example, a link congestion causes increased round trip
times followed by increased number of packet drops. As a
result, affected hosts eventually experience large number of
packet drops. Spatial correlation can detect these hosts. During
the anomaly, all of the affected hosts experience increased RTT
as well. Therefore, time-series correlation can analyze spatial
correlation results and find group of hosts that show correlation
in time domain as well as space domain.
In our framework, agents periodically monitor and analyze
traffic traces and summarize observed symptoms into a report.
Controller correlates reports in space domain to reveal clusters
of hosts that experience similar symptoms at roughly the same
time. Then, the controller performs time domain analysis on
each of the spatially-correlated clusters. Groups of hosts with
high spatial as well as time domain correlation are considered
to be abnormal. These groups are reported to the data center
operators and are marked for performing mitigation.
III. SYMPTOMS
We adopted the following set of symptoms for anomaly
detection:
• Change of active flows: Sudden change in cre-
ation/termination rate of flows is a symptom of abnormal
behavior. The key observation is that the creation of new
flows by a large number of hosts in a short duration
is often a suspicious phenomenon that needs careful
monitoring and analysis.
• Change of flow size: Abrupt change in average flow size
is another symptom of suspicious application activities.
Due to the nature of general applications, the flow size
(the total amount of data exchanged) often has consistent
patterns in both the time domain and spatial domain. A
sudden change of the attribute either indicates a radical
change of the application or an anomaly.
• Similarity of observed RTTs: A sudden change in pattern
of observed round trip times between a pair hosts com-
pared to their history, is another symptom of potential
anomalies. The RTT between a pair of hosts is determined
by several factors: propagation delay, processing delay
in switches and routers, queuing delay in switches and
routers, and processing delay at the receiver. In data
centers, the main factors to consider include the queuing
delay and the processing delay. A dramatic increase of
the queuing delay is mostly caused by congestion, while
an increase of the processing delay can be caused by
overloading or malfunctioning at the receiver. While a
small number of isolated RTT increases do not pose any
threat, a large number of concurrent such symptoms could
indicate a critical problem that requires attention.
• Number of duplicate TCP ACKs: Observing large num-
ber of triple duplicate acknowledgments in a TCP flow
is another symptom of potential anomaly in networks.
Duplicate TCP ACKs are generated if some TCP seg-
ments are dropped in the network. This symptom can
be observed during normal operation because occasional
packet dropping is normal and could even be caused by
certain algorithms such as random early detection (RED)
[12]. However, a network problem such as prolonged
congestion or misconfiguration could trigger an unusual
number of such symptoms in large scale.
• Number of TCP RST signals: Observing TCP RST signals
is another symptom indicating anomalous behavior in
applications or operating system’s protocol stack. TCP
reset (RST) is a one-bit flag in the TCP header [22].
A host sends out a TCP RST if it notices that it is
not receiving acknowledgements for anything it sends
and thus the connection is unsynchronized. The signal
could also be triggered by certain middleboxes. In normal
operation, such flags should be scarce. Therefore, this
symptom is a good indicator of abnormal behavior.
A. Generation of Symptom Reports
Each agent reports to the controller one or multiple metrics
of an observed symptom. The metrics are:
• Frequency: Agents count the number of occurrences
for each symptom. This metric is used for observed
triple duplicate acknowledgments and RST flags. These
incidents by themselves indicate an abnormal behavior
in TCP connections, therefore no further processing is
needed for these types of symptom.
• Fluctuations: Local agents observe average size of a
symptom in each time window. The signed relative
change of the attribute in comparison to that of the
previous time window is calculated and reported in SR:
∆X =
XCurrentSample−XPreviousSample
XCurrentSample
RTT RST Duplicate Acks Active Flows Flows Size
Similarity Frequency Frequency Fluctuations Fluctuations
TABLE II: Methods to generate elemnts in SR.
This metric is used for detecting change in number of
active flows and change in average size of flows.
• Similarity: Local agents keep track of observed symptoms
in each time window. The objective is to determine how
similar the current set of observed symptoms is to that
of the previous time window. The calculated similarity is
reported in SR.
We use Jaccars’s similarity coefficient [23] to calcu-
late the similarity between observed RTTs. Jaccard’s
similarity coefficient measures similarity between finite
sample sets, and is defined as the size of the intersection
divided by the size of the union of the sample sets.
To calculate the Jaccardian similarity of current time
window to that of the previous window, agents dequantize
observed symptoms into labels. Jaccardian similarity is
calculated between current set of labels and the set from
the previous time window. This value is reported as the
similarity of observed symptoms to those of the previous
time window.
This metric is used for detecting changes in RTT. Due
to the nature of physical communication at network
observed observed RTTs do fluctuate for a flow. However,
a simultaneous increase in observed RTTs may indicate
a problem with the network and/or applications. Figure
2 illustrates an example of this process. In this example
observed RTTs from two consecutive time windows are
shown using dots. Numbers are converted to labels using
four bands. Finally Jaccardian similarity between the two
sets is calculated and reported.
Table II presents the method used for each symptom.
IV. SYMPTOM ANALYSIS FOR ANOMALY DETECTION
Our detection scheme relies on two algorithms to reveal
correlation between observed symptoms in both space and
time domains.
A. Distributed Analysis of SRs
in Space Domain (DAS)
Spatial correlation is performed using SR vectors. VMs with
similar SRs are considered to have correlation. From this point
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of view, the problem of finding spatial correlation is quite
similar to clustering problem in statistical data analysis [14],
[23], [25]. That is, given a set of vectors, identify one or
more groups in such a way that vectors in the same group are
more similar to each other than to those not belonging to that
group. The clustering problem has been extensively studied in
statistical data analysis and has been applied in a variety of
fields such as data mining [23] and machine learning [23].
DAS is a distributed modification of K-Means clustering
[14]. DAS has 2 components, the first component is performed
at each agent. It outputs local VMs that show similar symp-
toms. Second component, running at controller, has a global
view of VMs. It receives SRs that shown similar symptoms,
and outputs VMs with similar symptoms at data center scale.
1) DAS at Local Agents: Agents send VMs with similar
SRs to controller, filtering out normal VMs. In order to
perform this task, agents run modified clustering with K = 6
clusters. Algorithm 1 performs clustering with predefined
cluster representatives. It finds closest cluster representative,
Pi:0..5 to each SR and puts the SR in appropriate cluster,
Ci:0..5. Euclidean distance [23] is used as the metric. P0 = 0¯,
indicates experiencing no symptom. Pi:1..5 is the ith. unity
vector in R5, which indicates experiencing ith. symptom. VMs
showing no specific symptom will be clustered in default
cluster, with representative: P0. While, potentially abnormal
VMs are clustered according to their dominant symptom. For
VMs clustered in Ci:1..5 their SRs are sent to controller for
further analysis.
2) DAS at Controller: Main part of clustering is done at
the controller. Controller periodically receives all SRs showing
symptoms. It runs a highly modified K-Means clustering,
Algorithm 2, to find clusters of VMs that experience similar
symptoms simultaneously. At each iteration of clustering, SRs
are clustered into Ki clusters. It starts with K0 = 6∗L where
L is number agents. At each iteration, number of clusters is
halved: Ki = Ki−1/2. To find optimal number of clusters, we
use an elbow criterion [33]. At each iteration with K = Ki,
clustering cost, CCi is defined to be CCi = CGiKi . Where CGi
Algorithm 1: DAS at Agents
1 Algorithm DAS at agent(SR)
2 P0 ← 0¯
3 Pi:1..5 ← ith. unity vector
4 Ci:0..5 ← ∅
5 while There are SRs left do
6 Read SRj
7 Di:0..5 ← Distance(SRj , Pi)
8 k ← ArgMin(Di:0..5)
9 Ck.Add(SRj)
10 end
11 return Ci:1..5
Algorithm 2: DAS at Controller
1 Algorithm DAS at Controller(SR)
2 K ← 6L
3 i, CS0, CC0,∆CC ← 0
4 while K > 0 and ∆CC < 0.95 do
5 ClustersK ← Cluster(SR, K)
6 i← i+ 1
7 CSi ← ClustersKi .AverageSize
8 CCi ← CSi−CSi−1Ki
9 ∆CC ← CCi−CCi−1CCi−1
10 K ← Floor(K/2)
11 end
12 return ClustersK
1 Function Cluster(SR, K)
2 Pi:1..K ← K Random SRs
3 ClustersNEW ← ∅
4 repeat
5 ClustersOLD ← ClustersNEW
6 ClustersNEW , Ci:0..K ← ∅
7 while There are SRs left do
8 Read SRj
9 Di:0..K ← Distance(SRj , Pi)
10 k ← ArgMin(Di:0..K)
11 Ck.Add(SRj)
12 end
13 ClustersNEW .Add(Ci:1..K)
14 Pi:1..K ← Ci.Mean
15 until ClustersNEW = ClustersOLD
16 return ClusterNEW
indicates clustering gain, defined as CGi = C¯Si − C¯Si− 1
where C¯Si denotes average cluster size at ith. iteration.
Clustering is continued while CCi is improved. It is stopped
when CCi is in the 5% range of CCi−1, or Ki reaches one.
B. Time Domain Analysis of Clusters (TAC)
Controller further scrutinizes the historical records of
spatially-related VMs to perform time domain correlation.
There are two objectives to conduct this operation. Firstly,
it is possible that a group of hosts happen to exhibit similar
symptoms even though the symptoms are simply random and
isolated events. Although DAS filters out many coincidences,
it is not possible to eliminate such false alarms. Therefore,
we need to perform time domain correlation to look back
to the history to see whether the symptoms are persistent
or ephemeral. Secondly, anomalies tend to trigger multiple
symptoms in a sequential way. For example, overloading on
a link leads to increased RTT for many flows, and persistent
overloading further triggers duplicate ACKs and possibly TCP
RST signals.
The time domain correlation is performed using Time
Domain Analysis of Clusters (TAC). TAC is performed on the
output of DAS. Initially, agents send 5 most recent reports
of all the hosts in DAS output clusters to the controller.
Supposing symptom Sj has been detected among a set of
hosts using space correlation, we set a look-back window and
observe the occurrence of all the symptoms S1, S2, ..., Sk (not
including the final detected symptom by DAS) in the window
for each host. The result for host i in the cluster, hi, is a
vector Γi = [αi,1, αi,2, ..., αi,k], where αi,k is the indicator for
symptom Sk at host hi. Then, pairwise Jaccardian similarity
is calculated between all Γi vectors. If vectors Γi and Γj have
similar values for αi,k and αj,k, it means that symptom Sj
has been persistent and. In addition, hosts i and j in the set
have exhibited at least one symptom Sk in the first place since
they have been outputted by DAS.
TAC outputs VMs with high similarity in their pair-wise Γ-
vector. These VMs experienced at least one similar symptom
at roughly the same time while showing similar pattern of
symptoms in their provided history of time windows. There-
fore, they have shown correlation both in space domain and
time domain and are abnormal.
C. Mitigation
The mitigation process includes two steps. The first step is
to classify the flows or VMs to different groups based on their
symptoms. The goal is to distinguish misbehaving flows and
VMs that worsen the problem from victim flows and VMs that
are suffering from the misbehaving ones. For example, while
many flows may be suffering from increased RTTs, a specific
type of flows are reported to be increasing in quantities. So
it is very likely that this group of specific flows are taking
much of the bandwidth and overloading the networks, causing
other flows to suffer from congestion. The second step is
to limit bandwidth allocation to the misbehaving flows and
VMs. Therefore, we will not simply block the traffic of all
the suspicious flows and VMs. Instead, we will selectively
throttle the bandwidth of VMs that shown abnormal behavior.
V. CASE STUDY
We have further elaborate our design by analyzing how well
it would have worked on well-explored large scale data center
outages. Table III lists cases of recent reported large-scale
anomalies at Amazon AWS.
The first case happened in April 2011 [2], where a mistake
in routing caused data center wide congestions. This incident
was explored in detail in §1. During the incident, primary
nodes started to create new mirror nodes, which affects average
flow sizes shifting it towards larger flows. At this stage we
expect agents to create large number of reports triggered
with change in flow size. This correlation in space domain
will create clusters of hosts experiencing this phenomena. As
anomaly continues link congestions start to appear. Appearing
link congestion increases the RTT as well as number of triple
duplicate acks. At this stage agents report large number of
hosts that experience increase in RTT with large number of
triple duplicate acks. Controller receives the second wave of
reports that belong to a portion of hosts that experienced space
domain correlation. Therefore, clusters experience similar pat-
terns of symptoms and show time domain correlation as well.
Hence, as link utilizations increase our scheme will discover
space domain as well as time domain correlation. Automated
Anomaly Type RTT RST Duplicate Acks Flow Size Active Flows
Router misconfig (AWS, Apr. 12) [2] increase increase increase large increase
DNS misconfig (AWS, Oct. 12) [4] increase small increase
Load balancer misconfig (AWS, Dec. 12) [3] increase increase increase change
TABLE III: Analysis of recent well-documanted incidents at Amazon AWS
mitigation will throttle flows from affected hosts which in turn
alleviates congestion on links.
Our design is able to detect this anomaly and keep the
network alive by throttling flows. By notifying system admin-
istrators in a timely manner, it will provide sufficient time for
them to find the root cause. Meanwhile basic services are kept
alive thanks to the automated mitigation actions.
In the second case, happened at October 2012, a bug in
an operational data collection agent degraded Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2) and Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS)
performance. In some cases, EBS volumes became stuck [4].
The root cause for this problem goes back to 1 week earlier
when one of the data collection servers was replaced. While
not noticed at the time, the DNS update did not successfully
propagate to all of the internal DNS servers, and as a result,
a fraction of the storage servers did not get the updated
server address and continued to attempt to contact the failed
data collection server [4]. Because of the design of the data
collection service (which is tolerant to missing data), this
did not cause any immediate issues or set off any alarms.
However, the inability to contact a data collection server
triggered a latent memory leak bug in the reporting agent
on the storage servers. Rather than gracefully dealing with
the failed connection, the reporting agent continued trying to
contact the collection server in a way that slowly consumed
system memory until it reached a critical mass and caused
some of the provisioning services to become stuck eventually.
During the period where storage servers tried to reach the
missing server, we expect a lot of flows to be created and
terminated rapidly. This, translates to increase in flow creation
rate, huge number of triple duplicate acks, and shift in average
flow size to smaller flows. Therefore, this complex anomaly
caused by a misconfiguration in DNS entries, could have been
detected after replacing the data collection server. Although
our scheme is not able to pinpoint to the memory allocation
bug, it is able to detect the original anomaly in a timely
manner.
In another example, during a maintenance in December
2012 [3] human error caused disruptions and down times
in services that use Amazon Elastic Load Balancing. On a
group of load balancers, state data was partially deleted by
a maintenance process. As this continued, some customers
began to experience performance issues with their running load
balancers. During the anomaly, partial loss in load balancer’s
state data caused severe changes in traffic matrix. Therefore,
VMs may have experienced overload or underload which
directly affects number of active connections. Overloaded
VMs cause increased average processing time for replying
messages. As a increase in RTT would have been observed,
had our scheme were used at Amazon. Also it is safe to
assume that overloaded VMs started to drop packets resulting
in increased number of triple duplicate acks and TCP RSTs.
Therefore based on the huge number of correlated symptoms
that were generated, this anomaly would have been detected
in a matter of tens of seconds using our design.
VI. RELATED WORK
Anomaly detection and mitigation in data centers have
recently received a lot of attention [5], [7], [16], [26], [27],
[30]–[32]. However, research in this area is still in its early
stage. The most relevant works to our design include include
SNAP [31], NetPilot [30], PREPARE [27], and FlowDiff [5].
SNAP (Simplified Network-Application Profiler) is de-
signed to perform data analysis offline for identifying misbe-
having applications. It collects TCP statistics and socket-call
logs from all the hosts and performs centralized correlation
to identify application flaws. However, typical data center
operators may not have access to individual hosts and thus
could not get the TCP statistics and socket-call log files. This
is often the case for multi-tenant data centers. SNAP does not
address real time detection and mitigation of anomalies.
NetPilot is designed to automate data center network failure
mitigation. Its objective is to quickly mitigate failures rather
than finding a root cause and ultimately resolving the problem.
The mitigation process is the same as those adopted by
today’s network operators: deactivating or restarting offending
components. However, NetPilot is unique in that it takes an
intelligent trial-and-error approach to automate the process,
including an Impact Estimator that helps guard against overly
disruptive mitigation actions and a failure-specific mitigation
planner that minimizes the number of trials. However, NetPilot
is unable to deal with complex errors caused by applica-
tion/network/devices misconfigurations.
PREPARE is designed to provide anomaly prevention for
virtualized cloud computing infrastructures. In other words,
preventive measures are taken to prevent applications from
experiencing any anomaly. The proposed anomaly prediction
scheme relies on system-level metrics such as CPU, memory,
and disk I/O usage, and adopts a 2-dependent Markov model in
conjunction with a tree-augmented Bayesian networks (TAN)
model that is used as the classifier Once an alarm detected,
PREPARE identifies faulty VMs and steers the system away
from the violation state. The scheme also performs elastic
VM resource scaling and VM migration. PREPARE does
not analyze traffic characteristics, as it is designed to detect
application errors. It does not address the errors caused by
network device failures or network misconfigurations.
FlowDiff collects information from all entities involved in
the operation of a data center and builds behavioral models to
detect operational problems in the data centers. By comparing
the current model with pre-computed and known-to-be-stable
models, FlowDiff detects operational problems ranging from
host and network failures to unauthorized accesses. It relies on
passive measurements on control traffic from programmable
switches to a centralized controller in a software-defined
networking (SDN) environment. The design consists of two
phases: modeling and diagnosis. In modeling, FlowDiff creates
signatures for applications using flow attributes, connectivity
graph and delay distribution of packets belonging to the flows
from specific application such as domain name systems (DNS).
During diagnosis, FlowDiff looks for changes in application
and/or infrastructure signatures and raises alerts. However,
FlowDiff does not perform automatic mitigation. Instead, its
purpose is to alert the operator. Also FlowDiff targets only
data centers that are based on SDN.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a novel application-agnostic scheme to rapidly
detect and mitigate anomalies in data centers. We use dis-
tributed processing and data mining techniques to detect
anomalies in a timely manner. Detected anomalies are miti-
gated using simple actions such as throttling flows that belong
to abnormal VMs. Mitigation ensures that anomalies do not
spread throughout the data center. Our solution not only
prevents cascading failures, but also provides sufficient time
and information for data center operators to locate the root
cause of the anomaly and resolve it with a profound solution.
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